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Resumen
En este trabajo se analiza empíricamente la conducción de la política monetaria en Chile durante el
período 1986-1997. En particular, se busca determinar la efectividad de la tasa de interés real,
instrumento  empleado  por la  autoridad  monetaria,  para  afectar en forma  sistemática  el
comportamiento del gasto, la producción y la inflación. Además, se pone especial énfasis en la
determinación del mecanismo de transmisión a través del cual se darían dichos efectos. Para ello, se
utiliza la metodología de VAR estructurales, encontrándose en la mayoría de los casos sólo efectos
débiles sobre  las variables de  actividad y  sobre la  inflación. Sin embargo, en  el  contexto  del
Enfoque Australiano, nuestros resultados muestran efectos significativos de la tasa de interés real
sobre la “brecha gasto-producto” y de ambas variables sobre el nivel de precios de los bienes no
transables.
Abstract
This paper studies monetary policy in Chile during the 1986-1997 period. We concentrate in
understanding the monetary transmission mechanism by which the Central Bank instrument—the
real interest rate—affects total expenditure, output and the inflation rate. The methodology used is
structural VARS. We find a weak effect of the interest rate on all the variables. The interest rate has
a significant effect on the expenditure-output gap. Both the interest rate and the expenditure-output
gap have a significant effect on the price of non-traded goods, in line with the dependent economy
model (the Australian model).
______________________
This is a revised version of the paper prepared for the Third Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile
“Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms”, Santiago, Chile, September 20-21, 1999. The
authors hereby wish to thank Mr. Sergio Quintana’s cooperation, without whose patience and expertise in
econometrical issues and data processing this work would never have seen the light. Also the comments of
Mr. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and of the attendants to both the Chilean Central Bank’s Third Annual Conference
and the Pontifical Catholic University’s Economics Institute’s seminar. Email:  forecast@entelchile.net
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1. INTRODUCTION.
During the nineties, the Chilean economy has gradually cut down inflation rates from
figures in the thirties to 4.7% in 1998.  Accordingly, Central Bank authorities have pointed
out that the main objective of the monetary policy has been to reduce inflation to
comparable levels with industrialized countries’.  To that end, the designed monetary
policy’s instrument used has been an indexed interest rate
1, which has attempted to affect
the evolution of real market rates for different terms.  These, in turn, have supposedly
influenced the behavior of spending and aggregate production, thereby managing the
inflationary process consistently with the proposed stabilization goals.
This apparent success of the Chilean monetary policy in controlling inflation by using real
interest rates as its instrument deserves a closer look, because, in Lucas’s words:
“Central bankers and even some monetary economists talk knowledgeably of
using high interest rates to control inflation, but I know of no evidence from
even one economy linking these variables in a useful way...”
(Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Nobel Lecture: Monetary Neutrality, Journal of Political
Economy, August 1996)
Several earlier studies on the Chilean economy have confirmed the lack of solid empirical
grounds to back the existence (see Annex Nº2), of a systematic relationship between
inflation and interest rates.  Also, in those cases where some statistical support exists for
such relationship, the transmission mechanism that would permit it is not specified
satisfactorily. In that sense, it is frequently argued that policy interest rate increases
allegedly permit to reduce the gap between the aggregate spending and the GDP growth
rates, or between actual and potential GDP, thereby decelerating the inflation rate.
However, monetary theory states that the path of inflation must be linked to a nominal
variable, so in order to understand the connection between interest and inflation rates, it is
necessary to study the monetary policy’s transmission mechanism including the relevant
nominal variables.
                                                          
1 Until 1995 the Central Bank’s 90-day rate was used.  The one-day interbank rate has been in use since.3
Given the above, this article will analyze the Chilean monetary policy administration
during the 1986-97 period, identifying the instruments, intermediate and goals defined by
the Central Bank.  This analysis will permit us to determine and study the Central Bank’s
reaction function empirically.  Then different transmission mechanisms are reviewed that
permit to rationalize the Central Bank’s reaction function, which are empirically evaluated
using the structural autoregressive vectors methodology.
The reason why we chose autoregressive vectors as the econometric tool of our study was
to make our results comparable with those of a larger number of earlier studies. This,
because most studies use this methodology.  However, as will be explained in detail in the
third section, recent international literature shows categorically the need to complement the
traditional VAR approach with identification assumptions based on the theory and on
institutional considerations, thereby creating what is now known as structural VAR
systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section two is a conceptual discussion on
monetary policy administration and the reaction function used by the Central Bank during
1986-1997; Section three analyzes different possible transmission mechanisms of the
interest rate monetary policy; Section four reviews the structural VAR methodology,
presents empirical results and offers some interpretations; finally, Section five concludes.
2. MONETARY POLICY MANAGEMENT IN CHILE: INSTRUMENTS AND
GOALS.
During the 1986-1998 period the Chilean monetary policy considered the use of
intermediate instruments and objectives in order to achieve certain goals or goals.
Instruments are those variables that the Central Bank can control directly. Intermediate
objectives, in turn, are those variables that are not controlled closely by the monetary
policymakers, but whose behavior may be altered, with a certain lag, by using the
instruments.  Goals are thus eventually achieved since the intermediate objectives are
supposedly closely related with the end goals.4
a) Goals.
According to the Chilean Central Bank’s organic act, its goals are currency stability, a
stable internal payment system and the normal operation of the external payment system.
The first one has been construed as inflation control, even though the law suggests that it
should be perceived as price-level stability.
External payment stability, on the other hand, has been thought of as having a sustainable
current account deficit
2.  Based on the past experiences of the Chilean and other economies,
the Central Bank has theorized that this deficit should not exceed 3 to 4% of GDP in
average because otherwise it will, sooner or later, result in speculative attacks against the
domestic currency and a capital outflow, forcing the country into a costly adjustment
process.  In addition, the external payment stability objective has been interpreted as giving
certain stability to the real exchange rate’s evolution, which is the other side of the current-
account-deficit coin.
Finally, the objective of a stable domestic payment system has reflected on explicit
guarantees granted to bank deposits (up to a certain limit) which although not directly given
by the Central Bank, are backed by it as the lender of last resort.
Over the years the Central Bank has changed the relative importance it assigns its goals
with some degree of what might be called a “crisis mentality”, which is a common element
in monetary policy management.
3   Thus, after the indebtedness crisis of 1982-83, the
primary objective was the current account deficit, which led to a huge adjustment of both
private and public spending.  At the same time, a “high and stable” real exchange rate
objective was decided on, to thereby strengthen the exporting sector and repay the
country’s huge foreign debt.  As a result, during the eighties the low-inflation-rate objective
was secondary and subordinated to the real exchange rate, until by the end of the decade
voluntary capital flowed back in, thereby relaxing the external constraint.
                                                          
2 Such an interpretation is questionable. For example, Rosende (1998) argues that this objective cannot be
achieved through monetary policy, and that therefore it should be interpreted as having a monetary policy that
will not generate an exchange-rate or balance-of-payments crisis.5
Later on, during the nineties the Central Bank’s principal objective has been the inflation’s
control and gradual reduction.  However, the real exchange rate and current account
objectives have always been there, as proven by the sustained sterilized intervention of the
Central Bank in the exchange market during the period, together with the active
implementation of controls to capital inflows. Despite this, the current account deficit
corrected by the terms of trade’s long-term trend has been continually deteriorating since
1993, as shown in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT
(% of GDP)










Source: own calculations based on Central Bank data.
b) Instruments.
As for the selection of monetary policy instruments, from the mid-eighties to April of 1995,
the Central Bank used the “UF” or past-cpi-indexed interest rate for its 90-day instruments,
which were auctioned at a fixed rate through a window.
The case for using an interest rate as an instrument and for it to be a real rate, as opposed to
the common central-bank practice of using a nominal rate, is related with the variability of
the demand for money and with the disclosure of information by the Central Bank, as
sustained by Fontaine (1991).  In this sense, the author’s argument is that if the monetary
policy objective is informational, then in an indexed economy the best instrument is the real
                                                                                                                                                                                
3 See Bernanke and Mishkin (1992)6
interest rate, since it is clear that nominal rate movements are not always matched by real
rate variations.  Therefore, using the nominal rate as a monetary policy instrument may be
problematic, in the sense that it may give misleading signals to private players. In contrast,
the real interest rate will expectedly not only determine the evolution of spending, but will
also transmit the Central Bank’s perception on the state of the economy in terms of
domestic and external equilibrium. While Fontaine recognizes that the demand for money
is stable, the velocity is believed to be highly variable due to the heavy fluctuations of the
nominal interest rates caused by the UF mechanism. This makes the use of a monetary
aggregate as a monetary policy instrument unfeasible and, therefore, is believed to bias the
decision in favor of the real interest rate.
4
While several authors recognize that the instrument used has been the interest rate (see
Annex Nº1), Rosende and Herrera (1991) find that money supply movements are a better
predictor of transitory fluctuations in the GDP growth rate than is interest rate variation.
(see Annex Nº2). This result suggests that, even when using the interest rate as an operative
instrument, the Central Bank should try to control the money supply.  However, Rojas
(1993) holds that the monetary policy has not used a monetary aggregate as an intermediate
objective because, while the author finds that money does affect output transitorily, a stable
relationship only exists between money and nominal output for the M2A and M3
aggregates, whose use as intermediate objectives is supposedly limited by the scarce
control of them by the Central Bank.
In May of 1995 the Central Bank decided to change its monetary policy instrument,
dropping the 90-day instrument rate in favor of a shorter-term rate (the interbank one-day
rate).  The goal was to give the market a more important role in determining medium- and
long-term interest rates.   Thus the Central Bank auctions out its 90-day instruments so that
the market determines the interest rates thereof.  In this way, expected capital gains (or
losses) are prevented from generating sharp changes in term composition as used to occur
                                                          
4  It must be noted, however, that due to the fact that the UF reflects lagged inflation, interest rates using this
indexing mechanism do not strictly correspond to the real interest rate. See Calvo and Mendoza (1998).7




In accordance with the monetary policy transmission mechanisms that will be discussed
later on, the Central Bank has used as its main intermediate objectives the spending/ output
gap and the actual/ potential output gap, at both their levels and their growth rates (see
Annex Nº1). On this matter, the former president of the Central Bank, Mr. Roberto Zahler,
warranted the 1995 interest rate increase with the argument that “... but we must not forget
that both aggregates, that is the economic activity and the demand, continue to grow now
for the fifth quarter in a row, significantly above conservative estimations on the economy’s
productive potential increase and, therefore, above its trend level, with the resulting
pressures over domestic prices”
6.
In another intervention Mr. Zahler stated that  “...it is important to differentiate between
output and spending levels and growth rates.  When the economy has had several years of
growth above its potential, and it is also very near it, it is not enough to go back to growing
at the potential output rate.  If the appropriate levels are to be recovered, it is necessary to
grow at a below-potential pace for some time... This will permit us to return to the desired
path in terms of output and spending levels and reduce inflationary pressures.”
“Regarding domestic demand, we must note that it has grown so strongly in the past few
years that it has gone over the potential output level, pushing prices up and generating
pressures on foreign accounts.  An adjustment is needed, then, to take the domestic demand
to more reasonable levels.”
“... we use  al kinds of indicators to predict price behavior, such as the aforesaid gap
between potential and actual output, the evolution of wages, exchange rates, government
spending, credits, money supply, and others.”
7
                                                          
5 For a detailed analysis, see Budnevich and Pérez (1995).
6 R. Zahler, seminar on Latin American World Trade and Perspectives for the Year 2000, May 9, 1996.8
For these intermediate instruments to be operational, they must respond to the instrument in
a predictable way.  In other words, an interest rate increase must decelerate the growth rate
of spending by a larger amount than that of the output in the spending-output gap case, and
the output growth rate directly or through spending in the case of the gap with potential
output. Thus, for example, Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996) argue that “Monetary policy has
been based, for over a decade, on the control of the interest rate of some of the financial
instruments offered by the Chilean Central Bank. The grounds for this policy have been the
influence that these rates have, directly or indirectly, over the expansion rhythm of
aggregate spending and thereby on prices, especially of non tradables.”
d) Intermediate Objectives of Monetary Policy and the Central Bank’s Reaction
Function.
As aforesaid, the Central Bank’s interest rate policy has been structured around
intermediate and goals.  Thus, when setting annual inflation rate goals and implicit goals
for the current account’s trend deficit (a maximum of 4% of GDP at trend prices) the
Central Bank adjusts the interest rate instrument according to the evolution of the
intermediate objectives.
Consistently with the matters seen above, the Central Bank has used as its intermediate
objectives the rate of growth of spending with respect to the growth in output (i.e. the
spending-output gap) and the evolution of actual GDP with respect to potential GDP,
considering both the level and the growth rate thereof.  Thus, whenever the monetary
authorities have detected that spending is growing faster than GDP or that the actual GDP
has been growing more than the potential GDP for a few quarters, they have moved on to
try to adjust the growth in spending by using the interest rate as its instrument.  Within this
context, it can be stated that in recent years the manipulation of the interest rate has been
related to the application of the well-known Taylor’s rule (Taylor, 1993), whereby the
interest rate is adjusted upwards when the inflation rate exceeds the target and/or output is
                                                                                                                                                                                
7 R. Zahler’s speech at an ASIMET meeting, July 27, 19949
above its potential level.  In the opposite case, the interest rate is adjusted downwards.  This
rule can be represented by the following equation:
dR = a Y + b (P - P
*) (1)
where, “dR” is the first difference of the interest rate, “Y” is the output gap
8, P  y   P
*
stand for the inflation rate and the inflation target, respectively, and “a” and “b” are positive
parameters.
On the other hand, the inflation-target literature emphasizes that the Central Bank’s
expected inflation (inflation forecast) is the intermediate objective par excellence (Masson
et. al.., 1997). Thus, the monetary policy instrument responds to the difference between the
projected inflation and the inflation target for a specified period.  Within this context the
Central Bank’s reaction function is forward-looking, as opposed to reaction policies that
respond to intermediate objectives, as represented by past readings of certain variables.  In
this approach, the monetary policy’s operating method can be depicted by the following
function:









  and  P
*
t+j stand for the expected inflation and the inflation target for period  t+j,
respectively.  Within this analytical framework, the expected inflation results from a series
of statistical models combining several indicators, in such a way that the basic difference
between this monetary policy model and the one described by equation (1), is that it uses
expected inflation instead of past or present inflation to manage the policy instrument.
It must be noted, however, that the inflation target scheme is compatible with Taylor’s
monetary rule inasmuch as it can be argued that the output gap is the principal determinant
of the Central Bank’s inflation forecasts.  Massad (1998) suggests that the monetary policy
                                                          
8 Measured as the percentage deviation from potential output, or as the spending-output gap.10
may actually be managed nowadays according to the inflation target scheme, considering
activity and employment indicators, the spending-output gap, the current-account balance,
monetary aggregates, the wage growth and the interest rate’s yield curve.  This set of
indicators supposedly permits the Central Bank to build the core inflation’s future evolution
forecast and thereby adjust its instrument according to the gap between the forecasted and
the targeted inflation rates.
3. MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS.
The channels whereby the real interest rate –used as a monetary policy instrument- can
affect the end targets for inflation, current account and real exchange rate can take a
number of forms.   Below we shall identify five transmission mechanisms, namely: a) the
Australian Mechanism; b) the Phillips Curve Mechanism; c) the Interest-Rate Parity
Mechanism; d) the Monetarist Mechanism; and e) the Credit Mechanism.
a) The Australian Mechanism.
This transmission mechanism has the Australian Model
9 for its theoretical framework,
whose main assumptions are: a small open economy that produces and consumes tradable
and non-tradable goods; capital is a specific factor in both sectors; labor is mobile between
sectors and has diminishing returns; the domestic price of the tradable good is determined
according to the purchasing-power parity, the nominal exchange rate and the international
price; the relative price of non  tradables is determined by their supply and demand
equilibrium. Within this context, the real exchange rate, defined as the relative price of
tradables to non-tradables, depends inversely on the level of aggregate spending with
respect to the output
10.  This because an increase in spending over output will result in an
increase in the demand for both  tradables and non-tradables, thereby creating excess
demand in both markets.  In the tradable goods market, on the one hand, this will merely
                                                          
9 See for example Dornbusch (1980).
10 The equilibrium real exchange rate here is the one that clears the non-tradable sector. It must be noted,
however, that from a long-term perspective, it should also meet the requisite that the current account be equal
to the sustainable capital account.11
result in increased net imports and therefore in a drop in the trade account balance.  The
excess demand for non-tradables, on the other hand, requires an increase in the relative
price of those goods in order to reach equilibrium in the non-tradable sector, with the
resulting reduction in the real exchange rate.
Taking a closer look of the version of this model presented in Kamin (1996), the above
considerations can be put in algebraic terms as shown below:
 TCREt = a0 - a1  (G/Y)t    a1 > 0 (3)
 p
n 
t = b (TCRt-1 -TCREt-1 ) b > 0 (4)
substituting (3) in (4) we have:
 p
n 
t  = -b a0 + b TCRt-1 +  b a1 (G/Y)t (5)
Equation (3) reflects the fact that the equilibrium real exchange rate (TCRE) in the
Australian Model is inversely related to the spending to output ratio (G/Y).  Equation (4), in
turn, indicates that in the context of a pre-determined nominal exchange rate and slow price
adjustment, the convergence of the actual real exchange rate (TCR) towards the equilibrium
level takes place through variations in the inflation of non tradables (p
n).  From this, it
follows that the non-tradables’ inflation rate will depend on the gap between TCR and
TCRE. Finally, equation (5) shows that the evolution of non-tradables’ inflation is
determined by the spending-output ratio and by the actual real exchange rate lagged one
period.
It must be noted that within this analytical framework the exchange rate system will
determine how the real exchange rate will make its adjustments and, therefore, the effect
over the price level path associated to changes in relative prices.  Thus, with a fixed
exchange rate system, the appreciation of the real exchange rate takes place through the12
acceleration of non-tradables’ inflation
11.  In contrast, if the exchange rate floats, the
reduction in the real exchange rate occurs through a nominal appreciation, with the
resulting reduction in the tradable goods’ inflation.  Therefore, the relationship between the
spending-output gap and the inflation rate may be either positive or negative, depending on
the exchange system.
According to the above, in the context of this model, the relationship between the monetary
policy instrument  and the inflation rate must go through the spending-output relationship.
Thus, if the long-term real interest rate determines the evolution of investment expenses
and durable goods consumption, then the manipulation of the short-term interest rate by the
Central Bank, through its effect on long-term rates, can reduce the spending-output gap and
increase the equilibrium real exchange rate
12.  This, in turn, within a pre-fixed or indexed
exchange rate system, will result in reduced inflationary pressures.  In this sense, it must be
kept in mind that during the past 10 years the Chilean exchange rate policy has considered a
band whose midpoint adjusts to past inflation, together with corrections for foreign
inflation and productivity, thereby introducing a significant degree of indexing to the
nominal exchange rate.
As shown in Graph A, the nominal exchange rate variation between the first quarter of
1990 and the second quarter of 1995 trended downwards, reflecting the gradual reduction
of the inflation rate and sporadic discrete revaluations by adjusting the band’s midpoint or
band width.
13. These corrections to the exchange rate rule permitted a growing fraction of
the relative price correction associated to the spending-output gap’ evolution to materialize
through the nominal exchange rate, instead of  doing so through the non-tradable goods’
inflation.
                                                          
11 Strictly speaking, the exchange rate adjustment to a transitory demand shock may take place through an
increased price level without a variation in the trend inflation.  However, in an indexed economy inflation has
an inertia component and, therefore, any price level adjustment manifests itself in an increase in inflation. In
particular, the inflationary effect associated to a relative price correction shall appear especially strong in
those cases where indexation affects the nominal exchange rate.
12 In the short run, the reduction in the spending growth speed will also translate into reduced GDP growth.
13 The band’s midpoint also considers the evolution of the  deutschmark-dollar and Japanese yen-dollar13



































































































Source: own calculations on Central Bank data.
The above suggests that the gradual decline in inflation is tied to the path of the nominal
exchange rate.  In fact, as shown in Graph B, whenever the spending/output gap falls, a
later deceleration of non-tradables’ inflation follows, but in the periods where the gap
increases, inflation remains constant.  This behavior can be explained by the fact that
whenever the gap increases, the nominal exchange rate’s growth rate decreases and even
becomes negative in some periods, as can be seen in Graph A.
                                                                                                                                                                                
parities. For a detailed analysis of the exchange rate policy see Vergara (1994).14


















































SPENDING-PRODUCT GAP NON TRADABLE INFLATION
Source: own calculations on Central Bank data.
b) The Phillips Curve Mechanism.
This transmission mechanism is based on the famous Phillips Curve, augmented by
inflation expectations (Friedman, 1976). According to this approach, if actual output (y) is
larger than the economy’s potential output (yp), or if the natural rate of unemployment is
higher than the actual one, then in the short run the inflation rate of wages and prices (p)
with respect to the expected rate ( p
e) will accelerate.  The inverse relationship, where
causality goes from the inflation rate to the unemployment rate, results from a slow
adjustment of inflation expectations, rigid prices and wages or from lack of credibility of
the policies.  Actually, the short-run Phillips Curve is possible only if the actual inflation
rate is different from the expected one.  In the long run, therefore, there is no trade-off
between unemployment and inflation, because the expected inflation adjustment to the
actual inflation results in an unemployment rate equal to the natural rate and in actual GDP
in line with potential GDP.15
Equation (6) shows the Phillips Curve augmented by inflation expectations:
 pt = p 
e
t + c (y - yp )  c > 0 (6)
Assuming static expectations (the basis of the accelerationist hypothesis of Phillips Curve),
then p 
e
t = pt-1  and, therefore, the change in inflation will equal:
14
 dpt = c (y - yp ) (7)
It is worth noting that what counts here is the level of actual output as compared to its
potential, because an economy can grow faster than its potential for some time and not
result in inflationary pressures, if its initial output level is lower than the potential
15.
The transmission mechanism of the monetary policy in this theoretical context can be
described as follows: whenever there is a GDP growth trend above the potential GDP
growth, that after a while leads to a higher GDP level than its potential, an interest rate
increase permits the spending growth to decelerate, which in turn reduces the growth speed
of GDP until its level equals the potential. In addition, the increased interest rate may also
have a direct effect on the actual output through more expensive working capital.  Thus, the
deceleration of the GDP growth rate may also reduce the inflation rate to the level
determined by the nominal anchor (i.e. the exchange rate, a monetary aggregate or the
inflation target determined by policymakers) which in steady- state will equal the expected
inflation.
The output gap approach is widely used in the empirical literature on inflation
determinants. In this sense, as pointed out by  Coe and McDermott (1997), from the
available evidence on industrialized countries it follows that such a gap is an important
determinant of inflation. In addition, these authors find that for the Asian emerging
                                                          
14 Naturally expectations may be rational; however, the simplifying assumption of static expectations permits
to capture the essence of the transmission mechanism to be applied to empirical studies. See  Coe and
McDermott (1997).
15 Zahler (1994) argues in favor of levels being more important than the growth rates of actual and potential
output. See footnote 5.16
economies the output gap also plays a significant role in the evolution of their inflation
rates. However, for a large number of developing countries, the evidence shows that there
is no relationship between the output gap and the inflation rate
16. As for the Chilean case,
Mendoza and Fernández (1994) show evidence favoring this relationship.
c) The Interest Rate-Parity Mechanism.
The transmission mechanism of this approach is based on the international arbitrage of
interest rates.  Thus, whenever the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign rate corrected
by devaluation expectations and country risk, it induces a capital inflow, a nominal
exchange rate appreciation, a drop in inflation and an increased current account deficit
financed by the capital-account surplus.  Then capital mobility ensures that the domestic
rate cannot be out of line with the foreign rate and, in a fixed exchange rate system, said
mobility also implies that the Central Bank loses its ability to make autonomous monetary
policies.  In this sense, the question for policymakers is whether to stabilize the exchange
rate and have no independent monetary policy, or to have the interest rate as a  monetary
policy instrument and settle for a greater exchange rate variability.
In Chile, during the nineties the local real interest rate has been permanently above the
foreign rate adjusted by real exchange rate expectations and country risk.  The resulting
massive capital inflows have been partially sterilized, in such a way that the Central Bank
has accumulated substantial reserves. This has caused it significant equity losses, because it
issued debt bonds at an UF-rate above the one it gets from its dollar-denominated assets.  In
order to reduce the effect of capital inflows, for a long period the Central Bank imposed a
30% reserve requirement on foreign credits and investments not of “productive” nature.
However, as concluded by  Valdés and  Soto (1998), said reserve requirement has not
reduced the total amount of short-term capital and have only affected the composition
between the flows subjected to the reserve requirement and liberated flows
17.
                                                          
16 On this matter, see World Economic Outlook, October of 1996.
17 Recently, the Central Bank reduced the reserve requirement to zero, because of the Asian crisis.17
According to the above, the interest rate arbitrage has reflected on a changed portfolio
composition, where the private sector has borrowed in foreign currency and has acquired
UF-denominated assets, while the opposite has happened with the Central Bank’s portfolio.
So, supposedly, no direct effects have hit the level of aggregate spending and, therefore, the
real exchange rate has not been affected by the spending-output gap mechanism
18.
However, this did not necessarily prevent a transitory appreciation of the real exchange rate
through a nominal appreciation, and thus a drop in tradables’ inflation may have been
generated.  Actually,  the accumulation of international reserves may have led to the
exchange rate appreciating within the band
19.  This, together with a slow price adjustment
of goods, compared to the exchange rate, may have caused in the short run a real
appreciation and a deflationary trend in the prices of non-tradable goods.
On the other hand, it must be noted that with the exchange rate too close to the band’s floor
for long periods, the resulting continued accumulation of reserves and a number of discrete
modifications to the exchange rate band have taken their toll on its credibility, leading to
nominal revaluation expectations (which, in the presence of price inflexibilities, would also
mean a real appreciation, at least in the short run). This has strengthened the incentives to
capital inflow, so the Central Bank has had to endure several episodes of speculative
attacks, often being forced to validate the market’s appreciation expectations, either by
extending the band’s limits or by restating its midpoint.  As an example, let’s say that by
the end of 1994 the Central Bank accumulated in two months over 2.0 billion dollars,
which forced it to modify the exchange rate band in November, thereby permitting a
substantial appreciation of the exchange rate.
In addition, to the extent that an announced decreasing inflation target determine a certain
expected path for the nominal exchange rate variation and this implies a reduced real
exchange rate, the high domestic interest rates become irresistibly attractive for capital
inflows
20. In this context, short-term real exchange rate swings induced by the nominal
appreciation will be out of equilibrium and, therefore, a misalignment will occur between
                                                          
18 Keep in mind that in the medium and long run the increase in the domestic interest rate should increase the
real exchange rate, in accordance with the spending-output relationship.
19 For the effects of sterilized intervention on the exchange rate, see Edison (1993).18
the actual and the equilibrium exchange rate.  This, in turn, will introduce new deflationary
pressures over non-tradables’ inflation.
However, there is an alternative hypothesis that cannot be ruled out, that consists in that the
nominal appreciation only accommodates the equilibrium real appreciation.  In this case,
individuals would expect a real appreciation based on the evolution of fundamental
variables (i.e. relative sector productivity, spending/output ratio, government spending,
terms of trade, and the like), thereby increasing the gap between the domestic and the
foreign interest rates and provoking the capital inflows to validate the expectations.
21
d) The Monetarist Mechanism.
This transmission mechanism is based on the monetarist hypothesis of the economic cycle,
according to which a non-anticipated change in the nominal money supply will affect
inflation and transitorily also the  output  As opposed to the  Keynesian approach, this
theoretical scheme not only considers the interest rate as a transmission mechanism, but
also contemplates the effects thereof through a set of asset prices and real wealth.  Thus,
according to this approach, variations in the money supply affect interest rates and the
prices of stocks, land, and durable goods. All these variations in relative prices will affect
consumption and investment through multiple wealth effects and substitution effects.
According to the interest rate policy that the Central Bank has been using over the last 15
years, an interest rate increase results in a lower monetary expansion during the process of
adjusting to the new equilibrium, thereby affecting negatively the prices of other assets and,
ultimately spending, output, and the rate of inflation.
                                                                                                                                                                                
20 On this matter, see Rosende (1998).
21 Zahler (1997) argues in favor of this hypothesis when he holds that: “we cannot overstate that the real
appreciation of the Chilean peso during the nineties, around 4.5% per year, was the result of an equilibrium
process, that responded to the structural changes of the Chilean economy over the past years, and not to an
exchange rate manipulation with the purpose of artificially reducing the inflationary trend”.  On the other
hand, Rosende (1998) believes that the interest rate policy stressed the downward trend of the real exchange
rate.19
At this point it is worth noting that it is often argued that whenever a monetary policy uses
the interest rate as its instrument, nominal money will be endogenous, so that observed
variations in the nominal money supply will allegedly respond to movements of the
demand for money.  However, whenever the Central Bank chooses to change the level of
the interest rate, it does so through exogenous changes in money supply.  Certainly, once
the new equilibrium has been reached, money supply movements become endogenous
again
22.
e) The Credit Mechanism.
The unfavorable international empirical results to the hypothesis that holds that there is a
negative relationship between the interest rate and aggregate spending, have directed the
monetary policy transmission mechanism research to what has been termed the credit
mechanism
23.  This vision emphasizes the role of the banking system as a source of
financing for small and middle-sized companies, where the problem of asymmetric
information is most important.  Two transmission channels are proposed, namely the bank
credit channel and the Balance Sheet channel.
As per the credit channel model, an interest rate increase resulting in reduced money
growth, bank reserves and deposits will have a contractive effect on bank credits, thereby
depressing investment expenditure and this, in turn, will depress the GDP.  Note, however,
that as explained above, in an open economy a higher domestic interest rate may generate
an incentive to capital inflows, which can be intermediated by the banking sector, thus
leading to an increase in loans.
On the other hand, the balance sheet channel operates via a deterioration of the companies’
cash flow originating at the interest rate increase.  This magnifies the adverse selection and
                                                          
22 Unpublished results of the authors indicate that some correlation exists between money market imbalances
and an acceleration of GDP.  For Rosende and Herrera (1991) money market imbalances can be attributed to
the fact that the relative prices that the Central Bank attempts to stabilize (i.e. the interest rate or the exchange
rate) are far from their equilibrium, thereby generating endogenous movements of the money supply.
23 Examples of this can be found in Mishkin (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).20
moral hazard problems, thereby reducing corporate loans
24. This, in turn, has a negative
effect on investment and, as an end result, on GDP.
This transmission mechanism, together with the Phillips Curve or the Australian
mechanism, suggest that an increase in the interest rate will reduce inflationary pressures by
reducing the spending-output gap or the actual-potential output gap.
One example of the application of this approach is Edwards and Vegh (1997), who hold
that in Chile and in Mexico the banking sector played a fundamental role in intermediating
capital flows, which ended in an explosive growth in consumption (Chile in the eighties
and Mexico in the nineties). When capitals left these countries, banks were left with severe
financial problems, thereby deepening the recessions.  The authors build a model where
fixed-exchange-rate stabilization generates output and employment cycles through changes
in deposit-credit spreads and in bank credits.  In the empirical analysis, the authors use as a
proxy to a shock in the banking system the spread between interest rates for credits and for
deposits, finding that a shock in this variable will negatively affect economic activity.
4. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY
TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS.
a) Methodology.
A review to the relevant literature leads to the conclusion that the large majority of recent
studies on the effects of monetary policy use as their econometric tool the so-called vector
autoreggression (VAR)
25. However, the fact that the VAR methodology has been severely
criticized by several authors must not be overlooked.  The bulk of this criticism falls into
either of the two following categories:
                                                          
24 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that this effect should be applied not only to corporate investment
expenses but also to the individuals’ expenditure in durable goods.
25  Some  examples of this are  the works of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996),
Garretsen and Swank (1998), Cochrane (1998), Bernanke and Mihov ((1998), Rosende and Herrera (1991),
Valdés (1997), Mendoza and Fernández (1994).21
1. Those attributing it an non-theoretical nature, and
2. The ones that question the identification procedure used.
With respect to the first type of criticism, it can be said that it is basically a matter of
personal preferences, since not one of the econometric methodologies currently in
application is totally trouble-free.  This because although the economic theory does
establish relationships between variables, it seldom provides accurate predictions on the
dynamics of said relationships or distinguishes between endogenous and exogenous
variables.  This forces us to choose between imposing “arbitrary” constraints to the joint
dynamics of the set of variables and in selecting endogenous variables or adopting a totally
empirical approach, whereby the data “reveal” their joint dynamic process and all the
variables are treated symmetrically
26. The latter is the option implicit in the VAR
methodology.
To understand the nature of the aforesaid second type of criticism, the following example
will be used:
yt  + b12 zt = b10 + g11 yt-1 + g12 zt-1 + ey (8)
zt  + b21 yt = b20 + g21 yt-1 + g22 zt-1 + ez (9)
where variables (y, z) follow a stocastic process described by equations (8) and (9) and
where (ey , ez) are innovations or “white noise”.  This system of equations, known as the
structural VAR, may be described as shown below:
B0 xt  = G0 + G1 xt-1 + et (10)
where:  E(etet’) = S.
Pre-multiplying both sides of equation (10) by B0
-1, the autoreggressive vector is obtained
in its reduced form:
                                                          
26  On this matter, the classical quote is Sims’s paper (1980).22
xt = A0 + A1 xt-1 +et (11)
where the following definitions are used:





et  = B0
-1 et (12.4)
W = E(etet’) = B0
-1 S (B0
-1)’ (12.5)
the main fact worth singling out is that, given equation (12.4), every element in the
residuals vector of the reduced system is a linear combination of all the structural
innovations that affect the endogenous variables that make up the system.  Therefore, the
dynamic response (impulse-response functions) of said endogenous variables before a
shock in one of the system’s error vector components in its reduced form cannot be linked
to any specific the structural innovations in particular.
In the traditional VAR methodology the described identification problem is solved by
placing constraints on the contemporary effects of the variables and on their variance-
covariance matrix.  Said constraints, associated to  Cholesky’s decomposition assume a
recursive process, where the first variable included in the VAR system is not affected
contemporarily by any of the remaining endogenous variables, the second one is affected
contemporarily only by the first, and so on.
If the theoretical constraints applicable to the structural dynamic model are such that the B0
matrix is inferior triangular, with unit coefficients in the principal diagonal, and that matrix
S is diagonal, where the values in its diagonal are the structural innovations’ variances, then
said model will be appropriately identified by using the traditional procedure. In this case,
an estimation of parameters (B0,  G,  S) through the FIML (full-information maximum
likelihood) method can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood function with respect of23
the estimated parameters of the reduced form.  The FIML estimation of B 0  permits to
calculate the orthogonalized residues through the relationship et = B0 et, which corresponds
to the vector of structural disturbances.  Similarly, the orthogonalization of the impulse-
response function’s coefficients will generate the dynamic consequences of structural
innovations.  In general, however, the aforesaid constraints will not be the “true
constraints” imposed by the economic theory.  For such reason, a more flexible
identification procedure is needed, that will permit to incorporate constraints consistent
with the theoretical model being tested
27.
Given the above, in a second development stage of the VAR methodology more attention
was paid to the subject of identification based on the economic theory, and the so-called
“structural VAR” were developed.  The leaders of this line of research  were:  Sims,
Blanchard, Watson, and Bernanke.
The rationale of the structural VAR methodology is that any identification constraints being
imposed on matrixes B0 y S must come from the economic theory.  Once said constraints
are established it is possible to estimate the values of the structural coefficients that will
both satisfy and meet the condition given by equation (12.5).  To that end, the FIML
method is used
28.
One last methodological subject worth noting is related to the existence of conflicting
visions on whether the variables included in a VAR system must be previously filtered in
order for all of them to be stationary or they must simply be included in their “natural
form”.  Some  authors, such as  Sims (1980) and Doan (1992), argue against variable
differentiation even if they have a unit root.  These authors’ main argument is that the
structural VAR’s objective is to find any interrelations that may exist between the variables
included in the system and not the estimated values of parameters per-se.  Similarly, they
argue against variable filtering because this may imply lost information on joint movements
of the variables, such as the possible existence of co-integration relationships between
them.  However, the larger part of the other authors hold that the variables must be used in
                                                          
27  For further details on the VAR estimation methodology, see Hamilton (1994).24
such a way that the VAR can imitate the true data-generating process and, therefore, the
variables included must be stationary.
b) Identification Criteria Used.
As follows from the previous section, the characteristic element of the structural VAR
methodology that will be used herein is the use of identification assumptions explicitly
based either on the economic theory or in institutional aspects inherent to the reality under
analysis.  For such reason, this section will describe in detail the identification assumptions
used to estimate the various models considered here.  Said assumptions are listed below:
1.  Because of the monthly frequency of the data being used, the first assumption will be
that the monetary policy instrument (the 90-day PRBC rate) does not respond
contemporarily to variables that are not observable within the month, as is the case of
activity variables (production and spending). However, said instrument can respond
contemporarily to variables observed in the very short term, such as monetary and
financial variables and prices.
2.  Financial variables (i.e. exchange rate, market interest rates, and asset prices) can
respond contemporarily to any information, including non-observable one
29.
3.  Activity variables (i.e. spending, output, spending-output gap) respond to all the other
variables with a lag, except for working days and, in the case of GDP, to spending
itself
30.
4.  Prices of goods (i.e. CPI, non-tradables’ CPI) respond contemporarily only to those
variables affecting them directly, such as the exchange rate and international prices)
31.
                                                                                                                                                                                
28  See Hamilton (1994).
 
29  Because financial variables are not the result of the decision of one single player but arise from the
interaction of many of them inside the respective markets, they can be affected by variables that, without
being directly observable, do alter the equilibrium of those markets and by the players’ expectations regarding
the relevant variables’ future evolution.
 
30  This assumption is intended to incorporate into the models’ empirical estimation the existence of lags in
the production and spending decision-making processes or in the implementation thereof. Said lags may arise
from delays in the generation and disclosure of information the aforesaid decisions are based on, from
difficulties in their interpretation because of uncertainties (for example, with respect to whether shocks are
permanent or transitory) or from the presence of rigidities (contractual or other) that may hinder instant
reactions.25
5.  The real exchange rate only responds contemporarily to variables affecting it directly
(i.e. nominal exchange rate, international prices, non-tradables’ CPI)
32.
6.  In the case of the monetary-credit model, actual credits from the financial sector were
assumed to respond contemporarily to interest rates and money (which affect the credit
supply) because this is the monetary policy’s central transmission mechanism according
to this model.  Also, they might respond contemporarily to aggregate spending (which
affects the demand for credit).
c) A Review to the Principal Results.
No agreement exists regarding the need for the  variables included in a structural VAR to
be stationary, and as a way to check the robustness of the results obtained, all the estimated
models were estimated in three versions (except for the “Reaction Function” and the
“Phillips Curve”, that were estimated only in 2 versions), namely levels,  levels and growth
rates in 12 months
33, levels and first differences (of levels or of the 12-month variation rate,
depending on the type of variable)
34.  This  also permits to widen the number of works that
our results can be compared with.  For that effect, Annex Nº2 includes a table showing a
summary of the main results for the Chilean economy reported by other authors.
Because of space and clarity reasons, however, only the results of the version with the most
theoretical basis are shown, since they are easier to interpret (said version is the one
combining variables in levels and 12-month growth rates). Also, and for the same reasons,
in this version of the document only the impulse-response functions that have been
considered to be the central hypotheses associated to each one of the models estimated are
discussed herein
35.
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
31  This is one of the standard assumptions used in the Keynesian models to allow for the existence of real
effects associated to nominal shocks.
 
32  This assumption is a direct extension of the previous one.
33  The 12-month variation was used in those cases where it makes economic sense, as with price indexes and
production and spending figures.
34  This versión of the models sought that all the variables included comply with the seasonality condition,
which was checked using the Dickey-Fuller and the Phillip-Perron’s tests.
35  A complete version of  the impulse-response functions of this and other models estimated can be requested
directly to the authors.26
The Central Bank’s Reaction Function.
The table below describes the estimated model:
Variables Included
(see Annex Nº 3)
Nº. of Lags Period
TASA; CICLO; V12WUC; V12IPCSUB; seasonal
dummies; deterministic trend.
Five 1986.01 – 1996.12
a)  Response of the monetary policy rate to a one-percentage-point increase in the GDP’s
cyclical component:
•  As shown by the Graph, the
response is positive and strongly
significant after the fifth month
from the shock.
•  Said response peaks between 13 and 18 base points, fifteen months after the shock..
b)  Response of the monetary policy rate to a one-percentage-point increase in the 12-
month variation rate of nominal wages:
 
•  A positive, strongly significant
response of the policy rate to a
positive shock in the 12-month
variation rate of nominal wages  is
observed.
   









































c) Finally, Graph Nº3 depicts the response of the monetary policy rate to a one-percentage-
point increase in the core inflation.  From there, it can be concluded that:
•  The response is positive and
significant in the period from one to



























•  The maximum response appears around month five after the shock and it amounts to
slightly more than 10 base points.
The Australian Model.
The table below shows a summary of the main characteristics of the model:
Variables Included
(see Annex Nº 3)
Nº. of Lags Period
LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; GAP; LTCN;
LIPCNT;    LTCRINE; seasonal dummies;
deterministic trend.
Four 1989.04 – 1997.06
a)  Graph Nº 4 shows the response of the Spending-Output Gap to a positive shock of 50
base points in the monetary policy interest rate.  The following conclusions can be
drawn:
•  The response is negative, but not
large enough to be significant.
•  Said negative response extends
from month one and month
































•  At its maximum, the Gap reduction is one percentage point.
b) On the other hand, Graph  Nº 5 shows the response of the non-tradables’ CPI to  a
increase of 50 base points in the monetary policy interest rate. A review to said results
leads to the following conclusion:
•  Whenever the CPI level of non- tradables is used (Graph Nº 5.A), the response is
negative and significant (at 10%).
•  It must be noted, however, that when the non-tradables’ 12-month CPI-variation rates
are used (Graph  Nº 5.B), the traditional “Price Puzzle”
36 appears, because the
response is positive.  However, such response is not large enough to be significant.
c) Graph Nº 6 depicts the response of the real exchange rate (TCR) to a 50-base-point
shock on the monetary policy interest rate. The main conclusions that can be drawn here
are:
                                                          
36  The works by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and by Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) may be reviewed for
further information on this subject.
•  The logarithm of the TCR level
increases after the fourth month,
and the response is marginally
significant at 10%.
After two years the TCR is 2



































































d) Finally, Graph Nº 7 shows the response of the real exchange rate to a 5-percentage-point
shock in the Spending-Output Gap.
•  The response is negative and
significant.
•  Two years after the shock, the TCR
is 1.3 percentage points below its
trend level.
The Credit Model.
The table below shows the main characteristics of this model:
Variables Included Nº. of Lags Period
LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; V12M1A;
V12COLOC; V12GASTO; V12PIB; V12TCN;
V12IPCSUB;   V12DHAB; seasonal dummies;
deterministic trend.
Three 1987.01 – 1997.06
a)  Graph Nº 8 shows the response of the monetary aggregate M1A to a 50-base-point
increase in the monetary policy interest rate, leading to conclude that:
•  The response is negative.
•  The largest negative effect is
reached 6 months after the shock.






























b) Graph Nº 9, on its part, depicts the response of the financial system’s credit to a 50-base-
point increase in the monetary policy rate.  From it, the following conclusions can be
drawn:
•  The credit’s response is negative,
very persistent and significant at the
10% level.
•  This response is at its largest 18
months after the shock, with a
reduction 0.60 percentage points in




c) Graph Nº 10 shows the  response of aggregate spending to a 50-base-point shock in the
monetary policy rate:
•  A lagged negative response is
detected from the aggregate
spending in the fourth month after
the shock. However, this response
is not significant at 10%.
d) Graph Nº 11 shows the response of the “core CPI” to an increase of 50 base points in the
monetary policy rate:
•  The response is positive, revealing
the presence of the “price puzzle”
mentioned above, as is the case in
other studies on the Chilean
economy
37. However, said response
is not significant at 10%.
                                                          





















































































e) Graph Nº 12 depicts the response of the financial system’s credits to a positive shock of
5% on M1A. From the results, it can be concluded that:
•  The response is positive, arriving at
a significant marginal value at 10%
between month ten and month
thirteen after the shock.
•  The credit’s response peaks at 12
months after the monetary shock
and is near 0.5 percentage points.
f)  Graph Nº 13 shows the response of aggregate spending to a positive shock of 5% in
M1A.  The main conclusions from this graph are:
•  The response is positive and
significant at 10%.
•  Said response ranges between 4 and
13 months after the shock and
peaks near one percentage point.
 
g) Graph Nº 14 shows the response of the core CPI to a positive shock of 5% on M1A.  It
can be concluded that:
•  A negative response is observed
between the second and the fourth
month after the shock, which is
significant at 10%. This result can
be interpreted as another indication
















































































•  Subsequently, at the fifth month after the shock there appears a positive response
from prices, but not large enough to be significant.
 
h) Finally, Graph Nº 15 shows the response of aggregate spending to a positive shock of
5% in the financial system’s credits. The main conclusions that can be derived from this
graph are the followings:
•  The response is somewhat erratic,
but positive in the second and
fourth months after the shock, that
is marginally significant at 10%.
•  It must also be noted that the magnitude of the response is relatively large, with its
maximum around 5 percentage points.
Monetary Model - Asset Prices.
The main characteristics of the model that we have labeled “monetary-asset prices” are
shown in the table below:
Variables Included
(see Annex Nº 3)
Nº. of Lags Period
LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; V12M1A;
V12IGPA; V12GASTO; V12PIB; V12TCN;
V12IPCSUB;     V12DHAB; seasonal
dummies; deterministic trend.
Three 1987.01 – 1997.06
a)  Graph  Nº 16 shows the response of M1A to an increase of 50 base points in the




























•  The response becomes negative at
month five after the shock.
•  The largest negative effect is
reached 7 months later, it is
significant at 10% and amounts to
almost 1.5 percentage points.
 
b) Graph Nº 17 shows the response of the general stock price index IGPA to a positive
shock of 50 base points in the monetary policy rate.  It follows that:
•  The response is negative and
significant at 10%.
•  The response’s largest point is
achieved between 6 and 7 months
after the shock, and it equals 5
percentage points.
c) Graph Nº 18 shows the response of aggregate spending to a positive shock of 50 base
points in the monetary policy rate.  It follows that:
•  A negative response appears at
month eight after the shock, which
is significant at 10%.
•  The maximum effect is reached
between 15 and 18 months after the






































d) Graph Nº 19 shows the response of the “core CPI” to a 50-base-point increase in the
monetary policy rate.  These results yield the following conclusions:
•  Similarly to the credit model case,
this model finds a positive response
that reveals the presence of the
traditional “price puzzle”. However,
neither in this case is such a
response significant at 10%.
 
e) On the other hand, Graph Nº 20 shows the response of IGPA to a positive shock of 5
percentage points on M1A.  The following conclusions can be drawn:
•  A positive response is observed
between 1 and 9 months after the
monetary shock. However, it is not
significant.
f)  Graph Nº 21 depicts the response of aggregate spending to a 5% positive shock on M1A,
showing that:
•  The response is positive and
significant 10%.
•  Said response occurs between 4 and
11 months after the shock and
peaks near one percentage point.  
g) Graph Nº 22 shows the response of the core CPI to a 5% positive shock in M1A. The
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•  A negative response is observed
between the second and the fourth
month after the  shock, that is
marginally significant at 10%. Once
again this result can be interpreted
as a “price puzzle” manifestation.
•  Subsequently, a positive response of prices appears, but it is not significant.
 
h) Finally, Graph Nº 23 shows the response of aggregate spending to a positive shock of
10% on IGPA.  It follows that:
•  A  positive response is observed
that is marginally significant
between month three and month six
after the shock.
ThePhillips Curve Hypothesis.
The table below shows a summary of the estimated model’s structure to test the hypothesis
associated to the Phillips Curve:
Variables Included
(see Annex Nº 3)
Nº. of Lags Period
LTTUC; TASABC; TBE; CYCLE; DV12TCN;
DV12IPCSUB; seasonal dummies;
deterministic trend.
Five 1986.02 – 1996.12
a)  Graph Nº 24 shows the response of the discrepancy between actual and potential output
(cycle) to an increase of 50 base points in the monetary policy rate.  From this graph it





























•  The response is far from significant,
so –given the model’s specification-
no systematic response of the
GDP’s cyclical component is
observed to a shock in the monetary
rate.
b) On the other hand, Graph Nº 25 shows the response of the core inflation’s acceleration
to a 50-base-point increase in the monetary policy rate.
•  Although the observed response is
basically positive during the periods
immediately following the shock, it
is far from significant. Thus, it can
be concluded that in this case the
“price puzzle” that appears is of a
lesser degree than in other models
estimated.
c) Graph Nº 26 shows the response of the core inflation’s acceleration to a 5- percentage-
point increase in the discrepancy between actual and potential output.  It follows that:
•  Although at the beginning (between months three and four after the shock) a negative
response is detected that is not significant, from month five on a clearly positive and
marginally significant response can be seen at the 10% level.  This is an indication of
the presence of a positive effect from the GDP’s cyclical component on the core




                                                          
38 On this matter, see  Zahler (1994). It must also be noted that the international academic literature generally
calls “Gap Model” the empirical inflation models that emphasize the existence of this effect. One example of




























                                                                                                                                                                                
39 The existence of this effect supports the use of the GDP’s cyclical component as one of the elements in the
Central Bank’s Reaction Function.
•  The same graph shows that at its
peak –in month six- said response is
of 0.40 percentage points, given the
magnitude of the shock we use in
our experiment.
•  Also, the results indicate that the positive effect over the inflation’s acceleration will
remain until the eighteenth month after the shock.
d) Graph Nº 27 shows the response of the cyclical component of GDP (Cycle) to a 5-
percentage-point increase in inflation acceleration.  It can be concluded that:
•  A clearly negative response is
observed, that is significant at the
10% level.
•  At its largest, this response reaches
almost one percentage point and
stays negative during the 24 months
following the shock.
 
•  This evidence is opposed to the hypothesis implicit in the so-called “Lucas Supply”,
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The Interest-Rate Parity Model.
40
Variables Included
(see Annex Nº 3)
Nº of Lags Period
TASABC; LIBOR;  VTCREXPOST;
V3TCN;   V3IPC; seasonal dummies,
deterministic trend.
Six 1987.01 -1997.12
a)  Graph Nº 28 shows the response of inflation to an increase of 50 base points in the
monetary rate.
                                                          
40  The results below must be considered carefully.  Due to the lack of information available, it wasn’t
possible to include in the model estimated either a country-risk premium or an adjustment for under-one-year
foreign credit reserves.  Therefore, there may be a model specification problem because of  ommitted
variables, that might alter the results.
•  Again, there is the strong presence
of the “price puzzle”, since the
estimated response is positive and
highly significant.
b) On the other hand, Graph Nº 29 shows the response of the nominal exchange rate to a
50-base-point increase in the monetary rate:
•  Although, as predicted by the
interest rate arbitrage hypothesis the
initial response of exchange rate is
























•  Then, as of the seventh month after the shock, a positive significant response from the
exchange rate is detected, which goes in tandem with the inflation response’s
behavior.  This reveals that some degree of nominal exchange rate indexation exists.
 
c) Similarly, Graph Nº 30 shows the response of the nominal exchange rate to an increase
of 50 base points in the LIBO Rate.
•  In this case  a slight evidence in
favor of the arbitrage hypothesis is
detected, since in the month
contemporary to the shock there is a
positive, significant response.
Afterwards, however, the response









d) Finally, Graph Nº 31 shows the response of the rate of inflation to a positive shock of 5
percentage points in the rate of variation of the nominal exchange rate.
•  As can be seen in the graph, there is
a positive, marginally significant
response after 3 months from the
aforesaid shock. This reveals that
the exchange rate fluctuations have
affected the inflation’s evolution
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d) Lessons to Be Learned About Monetary Policy Effectiveness.
A number of conclusions can be derived from the results in the previous section, with
respect to monetary policy effects on several macroeconomic variables. This section will
focus on the effects on 4 such variables, namely inflation, output, spending, and the real
exchange rate.
Monetary Policy and Inflation.
The results associated to the Australian Model indicate that a positive innovation of 50 base
points in the monetary policy interest rate will provoke a negative deviation of the non-
tradables’ CPI from its trend, the magnitude whereof would amount to around 0.4
percentage points after one year and 0.6 percentage points after 2 years.  These results are
similar to the ones obtained by Rosende and Herrera (1991), who estimate that an increase
of 120 base points in the banks’ deposit interest rate provokes a global price level deviation
from its trend in the 0.43 to 0.75 percentage points range, with an estimated duration of
roughly 6 quarters.
41
Our results also seem generally consistent with the ones obtained by Eyzaguirre and Rojas
(1996), who estimate that a 100-base-point increase in the banks’ credit interest rate will
reduce the non-tradables’ inflation by 0.3 percentage points after one year, and will jump to
1 percentage point after one year and a half..
42
In contrast, the papers by Valdés (1997) and Mendoza and Fernández (1994) find a positive
response of inflation to a shock of the same sign in the interest rate. On this matter, it must
be noted that Mendoza and Fernández describe their result pointing out that, while there
                                                          
41  Considering that the magnitude of the shock used in our estimate is 0.42 times the magnitude of Rosende
and Herrera’s shock, and that the share of non-tradables in the overall CPI is 50%, it can be concluded that the
responses calculated in both studies are very similar in size.  However, special care must be taken with this
conclusion because it will hold only if the CPI of tradables is independent from that of non-tradables, a
condition that will not occur in the presence of any degree of exchange-rate indexation.
42  It must be noted that in the papers by both Rosende and Herrera and by Eyzaguirre and Rojas, the shock
analyzed is not the true monetary policy instrument, so interpreting them as monetary shocks is dubious.41
appears to be no systematic effect of the interest rate on inflation, upon sharp increases in
said rate (such as the ones observed in Chile between 1988 and 1992), there will be a
negative effect on inflation with a 9-month lag.  On the other hand, in an attempt to resolve
the aforesaid puzzle,  Valdés uses as a variable the difference between actual and the
Central-Bank’s target inflation, and finds a negative effect of the interest rate on that
difference.  However, in our opinion this procedure is inadequate because the reported
result implies that an increase in the interest rate would provoke an increase in the target
inflation (and this would be larger than the one observed in actual inflation, in such a way
as to reduce the differential) which makes no economic sense. Another problem in Valdes’s
procedure is his use of the inflationary projections of a local consulting office as a target
inflation proxy, very questionable. For such reason, we reconstructed the aforesaid
inflationary differential using the targets reported by the Central Bank itself from 1991 on
(see  Magendzo, 1997) and incorporated it into different VAR systems, and found no
systematic effect of the interest rate on it.
The “price puzzle” is present in many of the models estimated in this work.  However, a
global evaluation of our results yields that, as stated by Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), the
“price puzzle” is supposedly the result of wrong identification assumptions and of
specification problems in the VAR system.
43
Monetary policy and Activity.
As for the monetary policy effects on activity indicators, our results show very weak
negative responses by aggregate spending, GDP, and the GDP’s cyclical component to
positive shocks in the interest rate used as a monetary policy instrument.  Only in the case
of the gap between the growth rates of spending and output is a stronger negative response
detected, that lasts 13 months and that in its maximum point (around month eight) is
                                                          
43  This, because by using identifying assumptions consistent with our results, a substantial mitigation of the
anomalous response of inflation appears in comparison with the VAR systems with the traditional recursive
identification (non-structural VAR). In addition, said results show that the strength of the “price puzzle”
varies inversely to the estimated model’s global adjustment.42
somewhere between one and two percentage points, to an increase of 50 base points in the
aforesaid interest rate.
On the other hand, it must be noted that our results show significant positive responses
from both GDP and aggregate spending to positive innovations in the nominal money
supply.  In the case of aggregate spending, said response is observed between the fourth
and the thirteenth month after the shock (of 5 percentage points in M1A) and reaches a
magnitude of 0.5 to 1 percentage point.
Rosende and  Herrera (1991), in turn, find a positive effect of nominal money on the
deviation of GDP from its trend so that, according to their estimates, a 3.2-percentage-point
increase in the money supply will generate a positive deviation of GDP ranging between
0.36 and 0.89 percentage points during 4 quarters.  Similarly, they find that an increase of
120 base points in the interest rate (of price-level-adjustable 1-year bank deposits) will
reduce the output’s deviation by an estimated 0.97 to 1.25 percentage points after 4
quarters, an effect that will fade out in the seventh quarter after the shock.
44
More consistently with our results on this matter, Mendoza and Fernández (1994) find no
systematic effect of the interest rate (of 1-year bank credits) on the GDP’s gap from its
potential level, but they do observe a Granger causality from M1A to this gap.
Along the line of Rosende and Herrera’s results, Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996) find that an
increase of 100 base points in the interest rate (of 1-year bank credits) will reduce the
aggregate spending’s growth rate by an estimated 1 percentage point in the short run, an
effect that will reach an estimated 1.5 percentage points after 5 to 6 quarters.
Finally, Valdés (1997) also finds a negative effect of the interest rate (of 90-day PRBCs) on
the output growth rate (IMACEC approximation). Such an effect will be observed for an
                                                          
44  Unfortunately,  Rosende and  Herrera do not report the significance bands associated to the impulse-
response functions, so it is not possible to determine whether or not the effects detected are statistiacally
significant.43
estimated 4 to 15 months after the shock and will amount to some 0.5 percentage points
upon an increase of 30 base points in the aforesaid interest rate.
A global evaluation of these results leads to the conclusion that the estimated response of
spending and aggregate production to shocks in the interest rate appears to be strongly
influenced by the VAR-system specification used. In contrast, the effects of monetary
innovations appear to be more robust.
Monetary policy and Real Exchange Rate.
The Australian Model version reported herein shows that a positive shock of 50 base points
in the monetary policy rate will provoke a positive deviation of the real exchange rate from
its trend, which after a year will amount to one percentage point, and after two years will be
near two percentage points.
The results reported by Eyzaguirre and Rojas (1996) tend to back our own, because they
find a positive effect of the interest rate on the real exchange rate and state that, after 3
quarters from the shock in the interest rate, it explains around an estimated 20% of the
forecast error of the model with respect to the aforesaid relative price.
45
In contrast, the works by Mendoza and  Fernández (1994) and  Valdés (1997) find no




The most robust results of our research are those on the Central Bank’s Reaction Function.
In this sense, the evidence shows that during the period analyzed the monetary authorities
                                                          
45  Unfortunately, these authors report no estimates on the magnitude of the real exchange rate’s response.
46 It must be noted that the real exchange rate definitions used by these authors differ from the one used
herein, and ours is the same one used by Eyzaguirre and  Rojas.
47  Rosende and Herrera (1991) report no results on the monetary policy’s effect on the real exchange rate.44
have responded systematically to signs of “overheating” (a discrepancy between actual and
potential GDP or to a spending-output gap)
48 and to direct inflation indicators (nominal
wages and the CPI) by increasing the interest rate used as an instrument.
Paradoxically, the results yield  a weak evidence in favor of the hypotheses whereby
spending and output respond negatively to the monetary policy instrument.  In this sense,
the greatest response is found in the spending-output gap.  However, spending and output
do seem to respond systematically to shocks in the nominal money supply.  Here the
obvious question arises about the possible convenience of redefining the variable used as a
monetary policy instrument.
Still more paradoxical is the evidence showing that in the large majority of the models
estimated inflation responds positively to an increase in the monetary policy rate (price
puzzle).  It must be mentioned, however, that regarding the results offered by the traditional
VAR systems, the use of “structural” identification assumptions permits to reduce  this
anomaly substantially, making it non-significant in most cases. Also, within the Australian
Model’s context, a response with the expected negative sign and significant is detected.
Given this, it can be speculated that the “price puzzle” phenomenon is associated not only
to the wrong selection of identification assumptions, but also to specification problems in
the VAR system.  This, because the aforesaid anomalous result is observed with more
strength in the models that tend to be rejected by the data in general terms.
As for the global empirical evaluation of the theoretical transmission mechanisms, the one
getting the most support is the one associated to the Australian Model, since the results
show a (weak) negative effect of the monetary policy rate on the spending-output gap
49.
Also, a negative effect from the monetary policy on the non-tradables’ price level and a
positive effect on the real exchange rate level are detected.  Finally, the evidence shows the
                                                          
48  Although this version of the document only shows the results regarding the response of the monetary
instrument to innovations in the  GDP’s cyclical component, the impulse-response functions that were
obtained with the Australian Model are evidencing the existence of a positive and significant response to
shocks on the spending-output gap.
49  It must be noted, however, that from a strict econometric point of view, the correct way to compare the
estimated models is to use nested tests. Sadly, this can’t be done because the available data are not sufficient.45
existence of a negative effect from the spending-output gap on the real exchange rate (both
on its level and on its acceleration).
Monetary models, in turn, (under both the credit and the asset price approaches) get mixed
support. This, because -consistently with the models’ predictions- the empirical evidence
shows that the monetary policy rate has a negative effect on M1A, on the financial system’s
credits in real terms and on the real IGPA. It must be noted, however, that the evidence
shows that the positive relationship between monetary  shocks (M1A), the financial
system’s real credits and stock prices (real IGPA) are weak.
Still consistent with the monetarist hypotheses, most of the models estimated show the
existence of a strong positive effect on aggregate spending upon a shock in nominal money
balances. Also, the results obtained consistently show the existence of positive effects on
aggregate spending associated to shocks in both the financial system’s credits and stock
prices.
Despite the above, the monetarist view does not receive full support to its predictions,
because the evidence provides weak support to the presumption of a negative effect of the
monetary policy rate on aggregate spending.  Besides, the results show the existence of the
“price puzzle”, even with the anomalous response being non-significant more often than
not.
As for the Phillips Curve hypothesis, the evidence collected is adverse. This because the
results obtained do not permit to propose that a “Lucas Supply” exists, since innovations in
inflationary acceleration provoke a clearly negative effect on the  GDP’s cyclical
component.  Accordingly, neither is a significant effect of shocks in the monetary policy
instrument detected on the cyclical component of  the GDP. In addition, the same evidence
shows the presence of a “price puzzle”, but which, the same as in most of the other cases
where this result appears, is not statistically significant.
It must be noted, however, that the evidence collected when estimating the model we call
the Phillips Curve, shows a strong positive effect on the core inflation’s acceleration46
resulting from a shock in the GDP’s cyclical component. This is the primary prediction
arising from the empirical inflation models based on the “overheating” hypothesis (Gap
Model), that for many is another version of the Phillips Curve.
50
On the other hand, the hypothesis that gets the least empirical support, according to the
models estimated, is the interest-rate-parity one.
51  This, because the results show that the
sign of the nominal exchange rate’s response to shocks in the domestic interest rate is the
opposite of the expected one.  Besides, its response to shocks in the foreign interest rate is
very weak.  Finally, in the estimated versions of this model, the presence of the “price
puzzle” is strong.
Finally, it must be pointed out that after the above comparison there is no presumption that
the transmission mechanisms analyzed are intrinsically incompatible with each other,
because the theory shows that, in generally, they can appear simultaneously. Thus, the true
purpose of the aforementioned comparison is to determine which ones among the
theoretical transmission channels have manifested themselves with greatest strength over a
specific period of Chile’s economic history.
                                                          
50  See the references mentioned in footnote Nº 14.
51 As mentioned above, this can be due to specification problems in the model because of limited data
available.47
ANNEX Nº1:
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properties and affects the
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• Gap between growth
rates of spending and
potential output.
• Inflation
• Mid- and long-term
Current Account Deficit
no larger than  3-4% of
GDP
• Interest rate affects spending
growth which in turn affects
inflation.48
ANNEX Nº 2:
SUMMARIZED TABLE OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM SELECTED STUDIES
Monetary Policy Effect Over:





•  A 120-bp increase in the
interest rate causes negative
effect on price level deviation
from trend in the 0.43 and 0.75
percentage point range and
lasts around 6 quarters.
•  After 4 quarters, 45% of the
variance in price level
deviations is attributable to
shocks on  TCR and 12% to
shocks in the interest rate.
Money explains a mere  0.64%
of said variance.
•  A 120-bp increase in the interest rate will
reduce the output’s deviation from its trend
by 0.97 to 1.25 percentage points after 4
quarters. This effect is transitory, lasting
roughly 6 quarters.
•  A positive 3.2-percentage-point shock in
money will increase the output’s deviation
from its trend by an estimated 0.36 to 0.89
percentage points during 4 quarters.
•  After 4 quarters, shocks in money explain
an estimated 22% of GDP’s variance, while
shocks in the interest rate explain 14% of
said variance.  In the mid-run, (i.e.  8 to 16
quarters) the real exchange rate explains
nearly 43% of the output’s variance.
•  No results from the VAR
relating to the effects of
monetary  variables on the
TCR are reported.
•  90 to 365-day inflation-adjustable
deposit rate is used as a proxy to the
monetary policy instrument
•  Quarterly data are used for the
period from Q1 1978 to Q2
•  A VAR system is estimated that
includes: exchange rate; interest rate;
TCR (Central Bank); CPI; M1A;
GDP.
•  Variable deviations from the trend






•  The interest rate has no
Granger causality on the
inflation rate for 12 months.
•  M1A has no Granger-causality
on inflation, but inflation does
cause M1A
•  Week evidence exists that the
output gap with its potential
level has a Granger causality
on inflation.
•  No systematic effect exists on
inflation from an increased
interest rate in UF (actually,
the VAR shows an initial
positive response)
•  Only sharp interest rate
increases (1988-1992) induce
•  The interest rate has no Granger causality
on the output gap.
•  The M1A’s 12-month growth rate has a
Granger causality on the output gap, but not
vice-versa.
•  Unexpected inflation has a Granger
causality on the output gap (impulse-
response analyses show that the relationship
is negative).
•  No systematic effect exists of the interest
rate in UF on the output gap.
•  Only sharp interest rate increases (1988-
1992) induce a output-gap reduction with a
lag of 9 months.
•  No systematic responses to
shocks in the UF interest
rate or to shocks in the
growth-rate of M1A are
reported.
•  90 to 365-day inflation-adjustable
deposit rate is used as a proxy to the
monetary policy instrument
•  Quarterly data are used for the
period from January’86 to
March’94.
•  Granger causality test: interest rate-
intermediate objectives (i.e. money,
output gap (money; output gap);
intermediate objectives inflation.;
interest rate- inflation.
•  VAR: interest rate; 12 month
variation rate of M1A; actual
seasonally adjusted output gap-
trend; 12-month inflation rate; TCR;
terms of trade (exogenous variable).49






•  A 1-percentage-point increase
in the spending-output gap
will increase non-tradables’
inflation by 0.25 percentage
points during the 2 to 3
months following the shock.
This effect amounts to an
estimated 0.5-0.6 percentage
points after 5 to 6 quarters.
•  A 100-bp increase in the credit
interest rate will reduce the
non-tradables’ inflation by 0.3
percentage points after one
year, accumulating a 1-
percentage point reduction
after 18 months from the
shock.
•  Innovations in the spending-
output gap explain an




•  An increase of 100 bp in the credit rate will
expectedly reduce the spending’s growth
rate by 1 percentage point in the short run.
This effect will increase to 1.5 percentage
points after  5 to 6 quarters.
•  Innovations in the credit rate explain 25%
of the spending’s variance, and its greatest
impact occurs after the third quarter.
 
•  After 3 quarters,
innovations in  productivity,
the credit rate and the
spending-output gap
explain 20 to 24% of the
TCR each.  In contrast, the
differential between the
domestic and the foreign
rates explains no significant
fraction of said variance.
 
•  30 to 90-day inflation-adjustable
deposit rate is used as a proxy to the
monetary policy instrument
•  Quarterly data: Q1 1998 to Q4 1995.
•  Simple correlation analysis between
the PRBC90 rate,  the 30 to 365-day
bank credit rate and a hybrid foreign
interest rate (looking for
association).
•  Decomposition of the variance of the
PRBC90 rate, the 90 to 365-day
bank credit rate and a hybrid foreign
interest rate (looking for causality).
•  OLS  regression: first difference of
spending against own lags and
disposable income, the credit rate
and the foreign rate. Variance
analysis of spending forecast error.
•  OLS regression: non-tradables’
inflation against own lags and lags
of the spending-output gap, wages,
the exchange rate and tradables’
inflation; Variance Analysis of the
non-tradables’ inflation forecast
errors.
•  OLS regression: real exchange rate
against mean productivity lags, the
credit rate, the domestic-foreign rate
differential and the spending-output
gap; Variance analysis of the real
exchange rate forecast error.
  R. Valdés
(1997)
•  The  monetary policy rate has
a reported negative transitory
effect (between months 6 and
•  Transitory negative effect (between  months
4 and 15) on the growth rate of the
IMACEC. A30-bp increase in the interest
•  No significant effect •  Monthly data: January 1985 to
August 1996
•  The PRBC90 and the interbank rates50
12) on the gap between core
and target inflation. A 30 bp in
the rate reduces the gap by
0.4% after 9 months.
•  Non significant positive effect
over the “core inflation level”
rate reduces the IMACEC’s growth rate by
0.5% (maximum effect after 7  months).
•  Transitory negative effect (between months
7 and 18) on spending-output gap.
are used as a proxy to the monetary
policy instrument.
•  “Semi-structural” VARs: interest
rate; core-target inflation gap;
IMACEC’s 12-month variation rate;
TCR’s 12-month variation rate;
M1A’s 12-month variation rate;
Spending’s 12- month variation rate.51
ANNEX Nº3
VARIABLE NOMENCLATURE AND DESCRIPTION
BRECHA: Is the difference between the 12-month percentage variation of spending and
output. (Source: the Chilean Central Bank)
CICLO: Is the differential between the seasonally adjusted GDP logarithm and the
potential GDP.
DTASABC: Is the first difference of 90-day PRBC levels.
DTBE: Is the first difference of 8-year PRC levels.
DV12IPCSUB:Is the first difference of the 12-month percentage variation in the IPCSUB.
DV12TCN: Is the first difference of the 12-month percentage variation in the TCN.
DV12IPCNT: Is the first difference of the V12IPCNT variable.
DV12TCRINE: Is the first difference of the V12TCRINE variable.
LCOLOC: Is the logarithm of the Financial System’s Real Actual Credits. (Source:
Superintendence of Banks & Financial Institutions)
LDHAB:  Is the logarithm of working days (Source: own calculations).
LGASTO:  Is the logarithm of Aggregate Spending expressed in millions of pesos of
1986 purchasing power. (Source: the Chilean Central Bank).
LIGPA: Is the logarithm of the real IGPA.
LIPCNT: Is the logarithm of the non-tradables’ price index  (Source: National Institute
of Statistics INE).
LM1A: Is the logarithm of the money aggregate M1A (Source: The Chilean Central
Bank).
LIBOR: Is the 90-day LIBO rate deflated by the United States inflation. (Source: The
Chilean Central Bank).
LIPCSUB:  Is the logarithm of the Core Price Index  (Source: Catholic University’s Data
Base).
LPIB: Is the logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product in millions of pesos of 1986
purchasing power. (Source: Chilean Central Bank).
LTCN: Is the logarithm of the Nominal exchange rate. (Source: Chilean Central
Bank).52
LTCRINE: Is the logarithm of the Real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of the
Tradables’ price index to the Non-tradables’ Price Index.  (Source: INE).
LTTUC: Is the logarithm of the terms of trade. (Source:  Catholic University’s Data
Base).
TASABC: Is the 90-day PRBC rate. (Source: Chilean Central Bank).
TBE: Is the 8-year PRC rate. (Source: The Chilean Central Bank).
VTCREXPOST: is the 90-day ex-post variation of the Real exchange rate, defined as the
90-day ex-post variation of the TCN, plus the 90-day variation of the United
States’ CPI, less the 90-day ex-post variation of the Chilean CPI.  The term
ex-post stands for the variables being advanced by one quarter.
V3IPC: Is the 90-day percentage variation of the CPI.
V3TCN: Is the 90-day percentage variation of the TCN.
V12COLOC: Is the 12-month variation of the Actual Credits in Real Terms.
V12DHAB: Is the 12-month variation of the working days.
V12GASTO: Is the 12-month variation of Spending.
V12IGPA: Is the 12-month variation of the Real IGPA.
V12IPCNT: Is the 12-month percentage variation of the Non-tradables’ CPI.
V12IPCSUB: Is the 12-month variation of the core CPI.
V12M1A:  Is the 12-month variation of the Money Aggregate M1A.
V12PIB: Is the 12-month variation of the Gross Domestic Product.
V12TCN: Is the 12-month variation of the Nominal exchange rate.
V12TCRINE: Is the 12-month variation of the Real exchange rate.
V12WUC:  Is the 12-month variation of nominal wages. (Source: INE).53
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